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Abstract. Goodman’s theorem (1976) states that HAω + AC+ DC is conservative over HA. The
same result applies to the extensional case, that is, E-HAω +AC+DC is also conservative over HA.
This is due to Beeson (1979). In this paper we modify Goodman realizability [6] and provide a new
proof of the extensional case.
1. Introduction
Goodman’s theorem states that intuitionistic finite-type arithmetic HAω plus the axiom of choice
AC plus the axiom of (relativized) dependent choice RDC is conservative over HA. This result does
not extend to the classical case. In fact, adding classical logic leads to a system as strong as full
second-order arithmetic. On the other hand, the same result does not apply to subsystems of HAω
with restricted induction [7]. The original proof of this theorem is due to Goodman [5] and is based
on his arithmetic theory of constructions. A direct proof appears in Goodman [6] and relies on a
realizability notion which blends together the model HRO of the hereditarily recursive operations,
Kleene recursive realizability, and Kripke semantics. A restyling of Goodman’s proof can be found
in Beeson [1], where Goodman realizability [6] splits into a realizability part and a forcing part.
The same framework appears in other papers on Goodman’s theorem [3, 4].
In this paper we introduce a customized version of Goodman realizability and give a new proof of
the extensional case, that is, we show that E-HAω+AC+DC is conservative over HA. The only known
proof of this result is also due to Beeson [1] (1). Beeson [1, page 9] points out that if we combine
Kreisel’s modified realizability with the model HEO of the hereditarily effective operations then we
obtain a realizability interpretation of E-HAω+AC into HA but we cannot force first-order formulas
to be self-realizing. The problem is that in Kreisel’s modified realizability the realizers are total
object. Beeson’s solution is to consider a version of Kreisel’s modified realizability for finite-type
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 03F03. Secondary: 03F10; 03F30; 03F35; 03F50.
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1Apparently Beeson does not consider the axiom of relativized dependent choice.
1
2 FRITTAION
partial functionals. We propose a different solution (2). We follow Goodman’s blueprint and define
a realizability notion which combines the model HEO of the hereditarily effective operations with
an extensional version of Kleene recursive realizability. Indeed, we define an extensional equality
between realizers of a formula ϕ, denoted p  (a, b) : ϕ, where a and b are natural numbers and p is
a partial function from natural numbers to natural numbers, whose intended meaning is ‘p forces a
and b to be equal realizers of ϕ’. By letting p  a : ϕ be a shorthand for p  (a, a) : ϕ, we therefore
prove:
• Soundness: for every sentence ϕ provable in E-HAω +AC+DC there exists an index a such
that for every definable set T of partial functions HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T (p  a : ϕ)
• Self-realizability: for every first-order sentence ϕ there exists a non-empty definable set T
of finite partial functions such that HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T ∀a ((p  a : ϕ)→ ϕ).
Goodman writes 〈p, a〉  ϕ. Our choice of notation p  a : ϕ arises from viewing ϕ as a type, the
type of its realizers. It is worth noticing that the indices in the proofs of both the soundness and
the self-realizability theorems are exactly the ones in [6, Theorems 1 and 4]. The verification is
straightforward, although burdensome.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the system E-HAω + AC + DC.
In Section 3 we review Goodman realizability. In Section 4 we present our version of Goodman
realizability and prove the extensional case. Finally, we show in Section 5 how to combine the model
HEO with Kleene recursive realizability to obtain a realizability interpretation of E-HAω+AC+DC
into HA, where the realizers are, as in Kreisel’s modified realizability, total objects. Actually, one
can define a Goodman version of this interpretation and prove its soundness in HA. What fails in
HA, but not in PA, is the self-realizability theorem, which makes this approach unsuitable to prove
the conservativity of E-HAω + AC+ DC over HA. We discuss this further at the end of Section 5.
2. Extensional finite-type arithmetic with choice
We assume familiarity with systems of arithmetic in all finite types (see, e.g.,[8, 9]). Here, we
formalize E-HAω + AC+DC following Goodman [6]. In particular, we have equality at every finite
type. We denote types by A,B,C, . . . N denotes the type of natural numbers. As in Goodman, we
also have product types A×B.
Types ::= N | A×B | A→ B
The language L of finite-type arithmetic includes variables at all sensible types, the constant 0 of
type N , the constant S for successor of type N → N , functions symbols for all primitive recursive
functions, constants for combinators Π, Σ, recursors R, pairing D and projections D0,D1 at all
sensible types.
Terms ::= variables | constants | f(α1, . . . , αk) | αβ
Here, f is a function symbol for a primitive recursive function and αi are terms of type N . In the
application term αβ, α is a term of type A → B and β is a term of type A. To be precise, for
all types A and B, we have a binary function symbol Ap of sort (A → B) × A → B . Therefore,
αβ stands for Ap(α, β) (3). We usually indicate the type of a term by a superscript as in αA. For
every type A we have a binary relation symbol =A for equality of type A.
Formulas ::= α =A β | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ∃x
Aϕ | ∀xAϕ
2Actually, our attempt to follow Beeson’s strategy turned out to be amiss. The problem is the soundness. To
make a long story short, partial functionals with extensional equality only with respect to total functionals do not
behave well.
3Note that we are dealing with a many-sorted first-order theory. The types are indeed the sorts of the language.
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Here, α and β are terms of type A. As usual in systems of arithmetic, we write ¬ϕ as an abbrevi-
ation for ϕ→ 0 = S0.
Axioms and rules:
Propositional logic:
(1) ϕ→ ϕ
(2) Modus ponens: if ϕ and ϕ→ ψ then ψ
(3) Syllogism: if ϕ→ ψ and ψ → χ then ϕ→ χ
(4) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ
(5) ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ψ, ψ → ϕ ∨ ψ
(6) If χ→ ϕ and χ→ ψ then χ→ ϕ ∧ ψ
(7) If ϕ→ χ and ψ → χ then ϕ ∨ ψ → χ
(8) ϕ ∧ ψ → χ iff ϕ→ (ψ → χ)
(9) 0 = S0→ ϕ
Predicate logic:
(10) If ϕ→ ψ then ϕ→ ∀xψ, for x not free in ϕ
(11) If ϕ→ ψ then ∃xϕ→ ψ, for x not free in ψ
(12) ∀xϕ→ ϕ(α), ϕ(α) → ∃xϕ, for any term α free for x in ϕ
Axioms for constants:
(13) ¬(0 = Sx), Sx = Sy → x = y, for x, y variables of type N
(14) Defining equations of primitive recursive functions
(15) Combinators: Πxy = x and Σxyz = (xz)(yz) at all sensible types
(16) Recursors: Rxy0 = x and Rxy(Sz) = y(Rxyz)z at all sensible types
(17) D0(Dxy) = x and D1(Dxy) = y, for x of type A and y of type B
(18) x = D(D0x)(D1x), for x of type A×B
Induction:
(19) If ϕ(0) and ϕ(x) → ϕ(Sx) then ϕ(x), for x variable of type N
Equality:
(20) x = x, for x of type A
(21) x = y ∨ ¬(x = y), for x and y of type N
(22) Leibniz: x = y ∧ ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y), for x and y of type A
Extensionality:
(23) ∀z(xz = yz)→ x = y, for z of type A and x, y of type A→ B
Axiom of choice:
(24) ∀x∃yϕ(x, y)→ ∃z∀xϕ(x, zx), for x of type A, y of type B, and z of type A→ B
Axiom of relativized dependent choice:
(25) ∀x[ϕ(x) → ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))] → ∀x[ϕ(x) → ∃z(z0 = x ∧ ∀vψ(zv, z(Sv)))], for x and y of
type A, z of type N → A and v of type N .
E-HAω is the system (1)–(23). Indeed, axiom ¬(0 = Sx) in (13) and axiom (21) are provable from
the other axioms. Similarly, the axioms (14) are redundant (combinators and recursors enable us to
define every primitive recursive function). The reason to include them is to see HA as a subsystem
of E-HAω (once we identify the function symbol S and the type N → N constant S). Indeed, let
us define HA to be the restriction of E-HAω to first-order formulas. By a first-order (arithmetical)
formula we mean a formula of L which contains only first-order terms and quantifiers of type N ,
where a first-order term α is defined as follows:
α ::= xN | 0 | Sα | f(α1, . . . , αk)
In particular, in HA we do not have axioms (15)–(18) and (23)–(24).
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Goodman [6] defines HAω without (axioms for) combinators and recursors. On the other hand,
Goodman has decidable equality at every type, that is, axiom (21) holds with no restriction. Good-
man’s formulation of HAω is thus different from other versions present in the literature. Our version
of E-HAω has equality at all types and is equivalent to a conservative extension of Kohlenbach’s
E-HAω [8] (Kohlenbach’s system does not have product types). Note that the restriction of axiom
(21) to type N is necessary, for otherwise we would have excluded middle for all formulas (by
proving that for every formula ϕ with free variables x1, . . . , xk there exist closed terms α and β
such that ϕ(x1, . . . , xk)↔ αx1 . . . xk =A βx1 . . . xk, where the type A depends on ϕ).
2.1. Notation. As usual, we denote by n¯ the numeral corresponding to the natural number n. We
omit the overline notation when clear from context.
Kleene application. Let {a}(n) be Kleene bracket application. As usual, we think of a as a code
for a partial recursive function from N to N. Similarly, let {a}p(n) be Kleene bracket application
relative to the oracle p. Throughout the paper p is a partial function from N to N. To further ease
notation, we write, e.g., ab for {a}(b) and apb for {a}p(b). More in general, we write an1 . . . nk for
(an1 . . . nk−1)nk. Similarly for a
pn1 . . . nk. For instance, a
pbc stands for (apb)pc. We might write
ap(b, c) in the interest of readability.
We tacitly assume the s-m-n theorem and the recursion theorem in HA (4).
Kleene equality. Write an = bm if an and bm are both defined and equal. Write an ≃ bm iff
either an and bm are both undefined or else an = bm.
By Λn.f(n) we denote a canonical index for the partial recursive function f . In general,
Λn1n2 . . . nk.f(n1, . . . , nk) stands for Λn1.(. . . (Λnk.f) . . .).
Types. To save on parentheses we agree that × binds stronger that →. Thus A × B → C
stands for (A × B) → C. We use association to the right. Let A1 → A2 → . . . → Ak be
A1 → (A2 → . . . (Ak−1 → Ak) . . .) and A1 × . . .×Ak be A1 × (A2 × . . . (Ak−1 ×Ak) . . .).
By x1, . . . , xk we denote a list of k variables. Similarly, by n1, . . . , nk we denote a list of k natural
numbers. This includes the empty list. Say for k = 0.
Tuples. Let 〈·, ·〉 be any primitive recursive bijection from pairs of natural numbers to natural
numbers with primitive recursive projections (·)0 and (·)1. Let 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 be 〈n1, 〈n1, . . . , nk〉〉.
Note that a natural number n codes a tuple of length k for any given k. To ease notation, we assume
a primitive recursive coding of sequences of natural numbers with primitive recursive projections (·)i
for any natural number i. We thus identify the tuple 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 with the corresponding sequence
of length k and write (n)i for the i-th component of the sequence. For example, if n = 〈n1, n2, n3〉,
we write (n)2 for n2 instead of ((n)1)0.
3. Goodman realizability: review
We review Goodman realizability [6] for HAω + AC + DC. Note that the formalization of HRO
in HA gives an interpretation |ϕ| of HAω into HA. In particular, for every sentence ϕ provable in
HA
ω there exists a number a such that HA ⊢ a realizes |ϕ|, where a realizes ϕ is Kleene recursive
realizability (5). Therefore:
HA
ω ⊢ ϕ
HRO
−−−→ HA ⊢ |ϕ|
Kleene
−−−−→ HA ⊢ a realizes |ϕ|
Since |AC| and |DC| are Kleene realizable, provably in HA, we have that:
4 s-m-n theorem: For all standard m,n there is a primitive recursive function s such that HA proves
{a}(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) ≃ {s(a, x1, . . . , xn)}(y1, . . . , ym).
Recursion theorem: HA proves that for all a, n there is e such that
{a}(e, x1, . . . , xn) ≃ {e}(x1, . . . , xn).
5Actually we should write HA ⊢ a¯ realizes ϕ. We omit such subtleties.
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HA
ω + AC+ DC ⊢ ϕ
HRO + Kleene
−−−−−−−−−→ HA ⊢ a realizes |ϕ|
Goodman’s realizability bundles together the above interpretations and combines them with a
Kripke forcing relation. Let us see some details.
Let T be a set of partial functions from natural numbers to natural numbers. We define p  a : ϕ,
where p ∈ T , a is a number and ϕ is a formula of L. We tacitly quantify p, q, r over T . Warning:
the discussion is informal. See for instance Kleene recursive realizability vs its formalized version
in HA. Note that in HA we cannot even talk about arbitrary partial functions. At the end of the
section we state the formalized versions from which Goodman’s theorem follows.
(1) First, one defines p  a ∈ A, where a is a number, p ∈ T and A is a type. We only mention
the clause for the arrow type.
• p  a ∈ A→ B if for every q ⊇ p and for every number n such that q  n ∈ A, there exists
r ⊇ q such that arn is defined and r  arn ∈ B.
This is a (relativized) version of HRO. The forcing relation is monotone: if p  a ∈ A and q ⊇ p
then q  a ∈ A.
(2) Second, for any p ∈ T , let Lp be the language L of HA
ω augmented with constants FAa of
type A, for every number a and every type A such that p  a ∈ A. Note that Lp ⊆ Lq if p ⊆ q.
Then one defines the interpretation (value) |α|p of a closed term α of Lp. This can be undefined.
We only mention the clause for an application term αβ.
• |αβ|p ≃ {|α|p}
p(|β|p)
The value is monotone, that is, if p ⊆ q and |α|p is defined, then |α|q is defined and |α|p = |α|q.
(3) Goodman realizability. Finally, one defines p  a : ϕ, where p ∈ T , a is a number, and ϕ is a
sentence of Lp.
• p  a : α = β iff |α|p and |β|p are both defined and |α|p = |β|p
• p  a : ϕ ∧ ψ iff p  (a)0 : ϕ and p  (a)1 : ψ
• p  a : ϕ ∨ ψ iff (a)0 = 0 and p  (a)1 : ϕ or else (a)0 = 1 and p  (a)1 : ψ
• p  a : ϕ → ψ if for every q ⊇ p and for every number b such that q  b : ϕ, there exists
r ⊇ q such that arb is defined and r  arb : ψ
• p  a : ∃xAϕ iff p  (a)0 ∈ A and p  (a)1 : ϕ(F(a)0 )
• p  a : ∀xAϕ iff for every q ⊇ p and for every number n such that q  n ∈ A, there exists
r ⊇ q such that arn is defined and r  arn : ϕ(FAn )
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness of Goodman realizability, cf. [6, Theorem 1]). Suppose ϕ is a formula of
L such that HAω+AC+DC ⊢ ϕ and let T be a set of partial functions. If the free variables of ϕ are
among the distinct variables x1, . . . , xk, then there exists an index a such that p  a : ∀x1 . . . ∀xkϕ
for every p ∈ T . In particular, if ϕ is a sentence, then there is an index a such that p  a : ϕ for
every p ∈ T .
Theorem 3.2 (Self-realizability of first-order formulas, cf. [6, Theorem 4]). Suppose ϕ is a first-
order formula of L with free variables among the distinct variables x1, . . . , xk. Then there exist a
nonempty set T of finite partial functions and an index a such that:
• if ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k) is true, then for every p ∈ T there exists q ⊇ p such that a
qn1 . . . nk is
defined and q  aqn1 . . . nk : ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k).
• if p  b : ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k), then ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k) is true.
In particular, if ϕ is a first-order sentence of L, then there exists a nonempty set T of finite partial
functions such that:
• if ϕ is true, then for every p ∈ T there exists q ⊇ p and a number a such that q  a : ϕ
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• if p  b : ϕ, then ϕ is true
In the self-realizability theorem we agree on letting ap be, say, ap0 if the list x1, . . . , xk is empty.
Alternatively, read apn1 . . . nk as a
p0n1 . . . nk.
Goodman’s theorem follows by formalizing the above proofs in HA. A set T of finite partial
functions is definable in HA if there exists a formula ψ(x) of HA such that for any finite partial
function p, p ∈ T iff ψ(p¯) is true. Here, we assume some fixed encoding of finite partial functions
with natural numbers.
Theorem 3.3 (Soundness in HA, cf. [6, Theorem 5]). Suppose ϕ is a sentence of L such that
HA
ω + AC + DC ⊢ ϕ and let T be a definable set of finite partial functions. Then there exists an
index a such that
HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T (p  a : ϕ).
Theorem 3.4 (Self-realizability in HA, cf. [6, Theorem 6] ). Suppose ϕ is a first-order sentence of
L. Then there exists a definable set T of finite partial functions such that:
• HA ⊢ ∃p (p ∈ T )
• HA ⊢ ϕ→ ∀p ∈ T ∃q ∈ T ∃a (q ⊇ p ∧ q  a : ϕ)
• HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T ∀b ((p  b : ϕ)→ ϕ)
Theorem 3.5 (Goodman’s theorem, cf. [6, Theorem 7]). Suppose ϕ is a first-order sentence of L.
If HAω + AC+ DC ⊢ ϕ then HA ⊢ ϕ.
3.1. Remarks. 1. For T = {p}, we have p  a ∈ A iff a ∈ HAp , where
HROp = {H
A
p : A type}
is the model of hereditarily recursive operations relative to p. In particular, |α|p is the interpretation
of α in HROp.
2. For T = {p}, Goodman realizability is essentially the HRO interpretation of HAω into HA
followed by Kleene recursive realizability relative to p.
3. The statement of [6, Theorem 1] is slightly different. Besides, it follows from the proof that
we can actually choose a in advance, that is, the index a does not depend on T but only on the
proof of ϕ. See our Theorem 4.1.
4. The statement of [6, Theorem 4] is quite different from Theorem 3.2. Moreover, Good-
man’s argument involves a rather complicated induction on the formula ϕ. A more straightforward
argument is as in the proof of [1, Lemma 4.1]. See also our proof of Theorem 4.2.
5. Goodman [6, Theorem 5] states that for every provable sentence ϕ and for every definable set
T of finite partial functions there is an index a such that
HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T ∃q ∈ T (q ⊇ p ∧ q  a : ϕ).
This is enough to prove Goodman’s theorem. That our version of the soundness theorem holds
follows from the proof.
6. Goodman [6, Theorem 6] states that if ϕ is a first-order sentence of HAω, then there exists a
definable nonempty set T of finite partial functions and an index a such that
HA ⊢ ϕ→ ∀p ∈ T ∃q ∈ T (q ⊇ p ∧ q  a : ϕ).
However, this does not work in HA. In fact, suppose ϕ is a sentence of the form ψ0 ∨ ψ1. Then we
should be able to find an index a such that if ϕ is true then for all p ∈ T there is q ⊇ p such that
q  a : ϕ. Following the proof, we have an index ai for ψi and a should be either 〈0, a0〉 or 〈1, a1〉.
Of course we can choose neither beforehand.
7. If we define Goodman realizability by replacing the clauses for → and ∀ with the following:
• p  a : ϕ → ψ iff for every q ⊇ p and for every number b such that q  b : ϕ, aqb is defined
and q  aqb : ψ
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• p  a : ∀xAϕ iff for every q ⊇ p and for every number n such that q  n ∈ A, aqn is defined
and q  aqn : ϕ(FAn )
then we can still prove the soundness theorem but we are no longer able to prove the self-realizability
theorem. This is where the ∀p∃q ⊇ p definition is at work.
8. It clearly follows from Goodman’s theorem that for every arithmetical sentence ϕ of HAω, if
HA
ω + AC + DC ⊢ ϕ, then PA ⊢ ϕ. Indeed, the proof of this weaker conservation result can be
obtained by using total functions instead of finite partial functions. Let ACA0 be the subsystem of
second order-arithmetic with comprehension and induction restricted to arithmetical formulas. It
is well-known that ACA0 is conservative over PA. One can show that if T is a set of total functions
p from N to N definable in the language of second-order arithmetic, and ϕ is a provable sentence
of HAω + AC+ DC, then there is an index a such that
ACA0 ⊢ ∀p ∈ T p  a : ϕ
Fix a first-order sentence ϕ and let T be the set of total functions from N to N which are Skolem
functions for every subformula of ϕ. Then T is definable and one can show that
ACA0 ⊢ ∃p p ∈ T ∧ ∀p ∈ T∀b ((p  b : ϕ)→ ϕ).
In fact, we can define a p in T by arithmetical comprehension. By putting the things together,
we have that if HAω + AC+ DC ⊢ ϕ, then ACA0 ⊢ ϕ, and so PA ⊢ ϕ, for any arithmetical sentence
ϕ.
Of course one needs to reprove the soundness and the self-realizability theorems and so this
is not a real simplification. However, note that we can work with total functions. Goodman’s
proof is designed for HA and to obtain the conservation result one must use partial functions so
that HA ⊢ ∃p p ∈ T . For instance we always have ∅ ∈ T . With total functions the definition of
Goodman realizability is much simpler. Basically, p  a : ϕ iff a Kleene realizes ϕ relative to p. For
instance,
• p  a : ϕ→ ψ iff for every b, if p  b : ϕ then apb is defined and p  apb : ψ.
In particular, the definition of p  a : ϕ is local, that is, it does not depend on other q ∈ T .
3.2. Discussion. One might wonder how Goodman’s theorem applies to concrete proofs in, say,
HA
ω + AC of a first-order sentence ϕ. How does the corresponding proof in HA look like? For
instance, it is not difficult to see that there is a proof in HAω + AC of the collection principle
∀x < a∃yϕ(x, y)→ ∃b∀x < a∃y < bϕ(x, y),
where ϕ(x, y) is any first-order formula, that uses only quantifier-free induction and countable
choice (6). In the proof of the soundness theorem no induction is used to realize AC. However,
the induction needed to realize quantifier-free induction depends on the complexity of the forcing
conditions, which in this case depends on the complexity of ϕ(x, y). In other words, the amount of
induction needed in the proof of collection in HA depends on the complexity of ϕ(x, y).
It would be interesting to find a more direct proof of Goodman’s conservation result that can be
easily implemented so as to give a direct transformation of proofs in HAω + AC into proofs in HA.
Goodman’s proof is not quite suitable for this purpose.
4. Goodman’s theorem for choice and extensionality
We aim to define a tailored version of Goodman realizability for both choice and extensionality
such that first-order formulas are self-realizing. As observed in Section 3, Goodman realizability is
essentially the HRO interpretation of HAω into HA followed by Kleene recursive realizability. Note
that the HRO interpretation of extensionality is not Kleene realizable (otherwise extensionality
6From ∀x < a∃yϕ(x, y) obtain ∃f∀x < aϕ(x, fx) by countable choice. Then take b = 1 +max{fx|x < a} so that
we have ∀x < a∃y < bϕ(x, y).
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would hold in HRO). Therefore Goodman realizability does not validate extensionality. Before
presenting our version of Goodman realizability, let us discuss some attempts to solve the problem.
Let us focus on the soundness. In fact, adding the forcing relation, although crucial for the self-
realizability theorem, is a routine matter.
1. The most obvious attempt is to replace HRO with HEO. This would validate extensionality.
The problem is that the HEO interpretation of AC is not Kleene realizable. For instance, (the
interpretation of)
∀xN→N∃eN∀yN (xy = {e}(y))
is Kleene realizable (any index for the identity function will do) but (the interpretation of)
∃z(N→N)→N∀xN→N∀yN (xy = {zx}(y))
is not. Therefore, the following instance of the axiom of choice
∀xN→N∃eN∀yN (xy = {e}(y)) → ∃z(N→N)→N∀xN→N∀yN (xy = {zx}(y))
is not Kleene realizable.
2. A second attempt is to consider Kreisel’s modified realizability followed by the HEO interpre-
tation of E-HAω into HA. That this cannot work follows from the fact that in Kreisel’s modified
realizability certain instances of independence of premise which are not provable in HA are never-
theless realizable. This is definitely a problem.
3. To avoid the problem in 2. one can first interpret E-HAω into HA by using HEO and then
reinterpret HA into itself by using a Kreisel’s version of Kleene recursive realizability. Note in
fact that independence of premise is not Kleene realizable. A direct realizability interpretation of
E-HAω + AC + DC into HA based on this idea can be found in Section 5. In this interpretation
formulas ϕ come with a certain type A and realizers of ϕ are objects of HEO of type A. By adding
the forcing relation we obtain a realizability interpretation which is sound but fails to satisfy the
self-realizability theorem. This is the problem described in the introduction.
So much for the attempts. Our solution is to combine HEO with an extensional version of Kleene
realizability. In a sense, the interpretation in 3. is also extensional since realizers are elements of
HEO. This is not the case here. We use HEO to interpret the quantifiers ∃xA and ∀xA, but we do
not see realizers as elements of HEO. Actually, every formula is a type, the type of its realizers, and
we have an extensional equality between realizers of the same formula. The link is the following:
if p  a : ∀xA∃yBϕ then p  b ∈ A→ B, where bpn ≃ (apn)0. This is what we need to realize AC.
On the other hand, extensionality is trivially realizable since it follows from its HEO interpretation.
Details follow.
We will repeatedly use the fact that p ⊆ q implies ap ⊆ aq, that is, for all n, if apn is defined,
then aqn is also defined and apn = aqn. Let T be any set of partial functions from N to N. From
now on, we tacitly quantify p, q, r over T . As in Goodman, our discussion is informal. The reader
will convince himself that all the definitions and proofs can be carried out in HA.
Convention. For the sake of brevity we write, e.g., p  abc ∈ A for apbc is defined and
p  apbc ∈ A. Similarly, we write, e.g., p  (an, b) : ϕ(Fcm) for a
pn and cpm are defined and
p  (apn, b) : ϕ(Fcpm).
(1) For every p ∈ T , for all numbers a, b and for every type A, we define p  a =A b and let
p  a ∈ A be p  a =A a.
• p  a =N b iff a = b
• p  a =A×B b iff p  (a)0 =A (b)0 and p  (a)1 =B (b)1
ON GOODMAN REALIZABILITY 9
• p  a =A→B b iff for all q ⊇ p and for all n,m, if q  n =A m then there is r ⊇ q such that
r  an =B bm.
This is a (relativized) version of HEO. Properties. (E1) Monotonicity. If p  a =A b and q ⊇ p
then q  a =A b. (E2) Reflexivity. p  a =A b implies p  a, b ∈ A. Symmetry. If p  a =A b then
p  b =A a. Transitivity. If p  a =A b and p  b =A c then p  a =A c. By induction on A by
using monotonicity. (E3) p  a =A→B b iff p  a, b ∈ A → B and for all q ⊇ p and for all n, if
q  n ∈ A then there is r ⊇ q such that r  an =B bn. (E4) For every type A there is a number
0A such that p  0A ∈ A for all p. Let 0N = 0, 0A×B = 〈0A, 0B〉 and 0A→B be an index for the
function λn.0B .
(2) For any p ∈ T , let Lp be the language L of HA
ω augmented with constants FAa for any a and
A such that p  a ∈ A. We simply write Fa when the type is clear from the context. In particular,
a term of L is a term of Lp for all p. Note that if α is a term of Lp (we also say that α is a p-term)
and q ⊇ p, then α is a q-term. The value |α|p of a closed term α of Lp is defined as in Goodman
by recursion on A. Note that |α|p can be undefined.
• |0|p = 0
• |S|p = |S| is such that|S|
pn = n+ 1 for all p ∈ T
• |g(α1, . . . , αk)|p ≃ g(|α1|p, . . . , |αk|p), for g primitive recursive and αi of type N
• |Π|p = |Π| is such that |Π|
pab = a for all p ∈ T
• |Σ|p = |Σ| is such that |Σ|
pabn ≃ apn(bpn) for all p ∈ T
• |R|p = |R| is such that |R|
pab0 = a and |R|pab(n+ 1) ≃ bp(|R|pabn)n for all p ∈ T
• |D|p = |D| is such that |D|
pab = 〈a, b〉 for all p ∈ T
• |Di|p = |Di| is such that |Di|
pa = (a)i for all p ∈ T
• |αβ|p ≃ {|α|p}
p(|β|p)
• |FAa |p = a
|R| exists by the recursion theorem. Properties. (V1) Monotonicity. If |α|p is defined and q ⊇ p
then |α|q is defined and |α|p = |α|q. (V2) For any term α with variables among the distinct variables
x1, . . . , xk there exists an index d such that d
pn1 . . . nk ≃ |α(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk)|p for all n1, . . . , nk, p.
Convention. For the sake of brevity, we write, e.g., p  |α| =A |β| for |α|p and |β|p are both
defined and p  |α|p =A |β|p. Similarly, we write |α|p = |β|p if |α|p and |β|p are both defined and
|α|p = |β|p.
We now extend the definition of equality to terms. Let α and β be closed p-terms of type A.
Then
• p  α =A β iff for all q ⊇ p there is r ⊇ q such that r  |α| =A |β|.
From (V1) it follows that if p  |α| =A |β| then p  α =A β.
Properties. (T1) Monotonicity. If p  α =A β and q ⊇ p then q  α =A β. (T2) Reflexivity.
If p  α =A β then p  α, β ∈ A. Symmetry. If p  α =A β then p  β =A α. Transitivity.
If p  α =A β and p  β =A γ then p  α =A γ. (T3) If α is a closed p-term of type A then
p  α ∈ A. (T4) Let γ(xA) be a p-term of type B, and α and β be closed p-terms of type A. If
p  α =A β, then p  γ(α) =B γ(β). In particular, it follows from (T3) that if |α|p = |β|p then
p  γ(α) =B γ(β). (T5) Let γ(x
A), δ(xA) be p-terms of type B, and α, β be closed p-terms of type
A. If p  γ(α) =B δ(α) and p  α =A β, then p  γ(β) =B δ(β).
Proof of (T3). If α is a constant of L of type A, then |α|p = |α| for all p. One can show that
p  |α| ∈ A for all p. If α is FAa , then p  a ∈ A by definition, and so p  Fa ∈ A. Consider an
application term αβ. Say α is of type A→ B and β is of type A. We claim that p  αβ ∈ B. Let
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q ⊇ p. By induction, we can find r ⊇ q such that r  |α| ∈ A → B and r  |β| ∈ A. Here we use
monotonicity. By definition, there is s ⊇ r such that s  |α|sr|β|r ∈ B. Since |αβ|s ≃ |α|
s
r|β|r, the
claim follows. 
Proof of (T4). If γ is xA then it is trivial. If γ is a constant see (T3). Let γ be an application
term, say (γ1γ2)(x
A) of type C where γi is of type A1 = B → C and γ2 is of type A2 = B.
By induction, p  γi(α) =Ai γi(β). Let us show that p  γ1(α)γ2(α) =C γ1(β)γ2(β). Let
q ⊇ p. By induction we can find r ⊇ q such that r  |γi(α)| =Ai |γi(β)|. Note that here we use
monotonicity. By definition, we can find s ⊇ r such that s  |γ1(α)|
s
r|γ2(α)|r =B |γ1(β)|
s
r|γ2(β)|r.
Since |γ(α)|s ≃ |γ1(α)|
s
r|γ2(α)|r and similarly |γ(β)|s ≃ |γ1(β)|
s
r|γ2(β)|r, the claim follows. 
Proof of (T5). Suppose that p  γ(α) =B δ(α) and p  α =A β. By (T4), it follows that p 
γ(α) =B γ(β) and p  δ(α) =B δ(β). By symmetry and transitivity, we get p  γ(β) =B δ(β). 
Remark. One can define, along the lines of Goodman, p  α =A β iff |α|p and |β|p are both
defined and p  |α|p =A |β|p. Both definitions are fine, but we get slightly different properties. For
instance, by our definition, if p  α =A β then p  γ(α) =B γ(β). This is property (T4). By this
alternative definition, we only get that for some q ⊇ p, q  γ(α) =B γ(β). This is however a minor
issue.
(3) For every p ∈ T , for all numbers a, b and for every sentence ϕ of Lp we define p  (a, b) : ϕ.
The meaning is that p forces a and b to be equal realizers of ϕ. Let p  a : ϕ be a shorthand for
p  (a, a) : ϕ.
• p  (a, b) : α =A β iff p  α =A β.
• p  (a, b) : ϕ ∧ ψ iff p  ((a)0, (b)0) : ϕ and p  ((a)1, (b)1) : ψ
• p  (a, b) : ϕ∨ψ iff either (a)0 = (b)0 = 0 and p  ((a)1, (b)1) : ϕ or else (a)0 = (b)0 = 1 and
p  ((a)1, (b)1) : ψ
• p  (a, b) : ϕ→ ψ iff for all q ⊇ p, if q  (c, d) : ϕ then there is r ⊇ q such that r  (ac, bd) : ψ.
• p  (a, b) : ∃xAϕ iff p  (a)0 =A (b)0 and p  ((a)1, (b)1) : ϕ(F
A
(a)0
)
• p  (a, b) : ∀xAϕ iff for all q ⊇ p, if q  n =A m then there is r ⊇ q such that r 
(an, bm) : ϕ(FAn )
Compare this definition with Goodman realizability. The atomic case is based on a different
interpretation of equality: HRO in Goodman and HEO here. Indeed, one can recover Goodman
realizability by reading p  α =A β as |α|p = |β|p and p  a =A b as a = b and p  a ∈ A. On the
other hand, one cannot recover our interpretation from Goodman realizability by simply replacing
the atomic case. The treatment of equality between realizers is indeed the main feature of our
interpretation.
Properties. (R1) Monotonicity. If p  (a, b) : ϕ and q ⊇ p then q  (a, b) : ϕ. (R2) If
p  (a, b) : ϕ(α) and p  α =A β, then p  (a, b) : ϕ(β). By monotonicity. Use (T5) in the
atomic case. In particular, if p  (a, b) : ϕ(Fn) and p  n =A m then p  (a, b) : ϕ(Fm). (R3)
Reflexivity. If p  (a, b) : ϕ then p  a, b : ϕ. Symmetry. If p  (a, b) : ϕ then p  (b, a) : ϕ. Tran-
sitivity. If p  (a, b) : ϕ and p  (b, c) : ϕ then p  (a, c) : ϕ. By induction on ϕ. Use (R2) in ∃ and ∀.
By a : ϕ we mean that p  a : ϕ for all p. In the proof of the soundness we use the following
property to verify that a : ϕ.
(S) Let ϕ be ∀x1 . . . ∀xk(ϕ1 → . . .→ ϕl+1). Say xi has type Ai.
• Suppose (a, b) : ϕ. Let p  ni =Ai mi for i = 1, . . . , k and p  (ci, di) : ϕi(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk) for
i = 1, . . . , l. Then there is q ⊇ p such that
q  (an1 . . . nkc1 . . . cl, bm1 . . . mkd1 . . . dl) : ϕl+1(Fn1 , . . . Fnk).
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• Suppose apn1 . . . nkb1 . . . bl−1 is defined for all ni, bi, p. Moreover, suppose that if p  ni =Ai
mi for i = 1, . . . , k and p  (bi, ci) : ϕi(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk) for i = 1, . . . , l, then there is q ⊇ p
such that
q  (an1 . . . nkb1 . . . bl, am1 . . . mkc1 . . . cl) : ϕl+1(Fn1 , . . . Fnk).
Then a : ϕ.
Note that the following instances of (S) hold true (7).
(S1) Let ϕ be ∀x1 . . . ∀xkϕ. Say xi has type Ai. Then (a, b) : ϕ iff for all ni,mi and for all p such
that p  ni =Ai mi for i = 1, . . . , k, there is q ⊇ p such that q  (an1 . . . nk, bm1 . . . mk) : ϕ(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk).
(S2) Let ϕ be ϕ1 → . . .→ ϕl → ϕl+1.
• Suppose (a, b) : ϕ and p  (ci, di) : ϕi for all i = 1, . . . , l. Then there is q ⊇ p such that
q  (ac1 . . . cl, ad1 . . . dl) : ϕl+1.
• Suppose that apb1 . . . bl−1 is defined for all bi, p. Moreover, suppose that whenever p 
(bi, ci) : ϕi for all i = 1, . . . , l, there is q ⊇ p such that q  (ab1 . . . bl, ac1 . . . cl) : ϕl+1. Then
a : ϕ.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness). Suppose ϕ is a formula of L such that
E-HAω + AC+ DC ⊢ ϕ.
If the free variables of ϕ are among the distinct variables x1, . . . , xk, then there exists an index a
such that for every set T of partial functions, p  a : ∀x1 . . . ∀xkϕ for every p ∈ T . In particular, if
ϕ is a sentence, then there exists an index a such that for every set T of partial functions, p  a : ϕ
for every p ∈ T .
Proof. By induction on the proof of ϕ. The indices are the same as in Goodman [6, Theorem 1].
Say xi is of type Ai. For the sake of brevity, we write A for A1, . . . , Ak and x
A for x1, . . . , xk.
For the remainder of the proof we assume that the free variables of ϕ are among xA. We
thus write a : ∀xAϕ or simply a : ϕ for p  a : ∀x1 . . . ∀xkϕ for every p ∈ T . To ease notation,
we write, e.g., n for n1 . . . nk so that a
pn stands for apn1 . . . nk and p  n =A m stands for
p  n1 =A1 m1, . . . , p  nk =Ak mk. Similarly, we write ϕ(Fn) for ϕ(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk).
We repeatedly use (S) and the fact that Kleene application and the forcing relation are monotone.
(1) a : ϕ→ ϕ, where apnb = b.
By (S), it is enough to show that if p  n =A m and p  (b, c) : ϕ(Fn), then there is q ⊇ p such
that q  (anb, amc) : ϕ(Fn). Easy. In fact, p  (anb, amc) : ϕ(Fn).
(2) Modus ponens: if c : ϕ and b : ϕ→ ψ then a : ψ.
As in Goodman [6] we have to deal with variables, say xB, that might occur free in ϕ but are
not among xA. Then the free variables of ϕ and ϕ → ψ are among xA, xB . By induction, let
c : ∀xA∀xBϕ and b : ∀xA∀xB(ϕ→ ψ). Choose a such that apn ≃ bpn0B(cpn0B), where p  0B ∈ B
for all p. We claim that a : ∀xAψ.
Suppose p  n =A m. By (S1), it suffices to show that there is q ⊇ p such that q 
(an, am) : ψ(Fn). Since p  0
B ∈ B, we can find q ⊇ p such that q  (cn0B , cm0B) : ϕ(Fn, F0B ).
Therefore there is r ⊇ q such that r  (bn0B(crn0B), bm0B(crm0B)) : ψ(Fn). Then r is as required.
(3) Syllogism: if c : ϕ→ ψ and b : ψ → χ then a : ϕ→ χ.
7Actually, (S1) does not follow from (S) but the proof is similar.
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As in (2) there might be variables, say xB , that are free in ψ but do not occur in xA. Let
c : ∀xA∀xB(ϕ → ψ) and b : ∀xA∀xB(ψ → χ). Let 0B be such that p  0B ∈ B for all p. Choose a
such that apnd ≃ bpn0B(cpn0Bd). We claim that a : ∀xA(ϕ→ ψ).
Note that apn is defined for all n, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p  n =A m and
p  (d, e) : ϕ(Fn), then there is q ⊇ p such that q  (and, ame) : χ(Fn). By induction, since
p  0B ∈ B, that is, p  0B =B 0
B , we can find q ⊇ p such that q  (cn0Bd, cm0Be) : ψ(Fn).
Therefore we can find r ⊇ q such that r  (bn0B(crn0Bd), bm0B(crm0Be)) : χ(Fn). Then r is as
required.
(4) a : ψ0 ∧ ψ1 → ψi, where a
pnb = (b)i.
By (S), it is enough to show that if p  n =A m and p  (b, c) : (ψ0 ∧ ψ1)(Fn), then there is
q ⊇ p such that q  (anb, amc) : ψi(Fn). Easy. We have that p  ((b)i, (c)i) : ψi(Fn), and so p is as
required.
(5) a : ψi → ψ0 ∨ ψ1, where a
pnb = 〈i, b〉.
Suppose p  n =A m and p  (b, c) : ψi(Fn). Then p  (〈i, b〉, 〈i, c〉) : (ϕ ∨ ψ)(Fn), that is,
p  (anb, amc) : (ϕ ∨ ψ)(Fn). By (S), a is as desired.
(6) If b : χ→ ϕ and c : χ→ ψ then a : χ→ ϕ ∧ ψ, where apnd ≃ 〈bpnd, cpnd〉.
First, note that the free variables of the premises are among xA. Note also that apn is defined
for all n, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p  n =A m and p  (d, e) : χ(Fn), then there is
q ⊇ p such that q  (and, ame) : (ϕ ∧ ψ)(Fn). Easy. By induction, we can find q ⊇ p such that
q  (bnd, bme) : ϕ(Fn) and q  (cnd, cme) : ψ(Fn). Then q  (〈bnd, cnd〉, 〈bme, cme〉) : (ϕ∧ψ)(Fn).
So q is as desired.
(7) If b : ϕ→ χ and c : ψ → χ then a : ϕ ∨ ψ → χ, where
apnd ≃
{
bpn(d)1 if (d)0 = 0
cpn(d)1 otherwise
Note that apn is defined for all n, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p  n =A m and p 
(d, e) : (ϕ ∨ ψ)(Fn), then there is q ⊇ p such that q  (and, ame) : χ(Fn). Suppose (d)0 = 0 = (e)0
and p  ((d)1, (e)1) : ϕ(Fn). Then we can find q ⊇ p such that q  (bn(d)1, bm(e)1) : χ(Fn). But
aqnd = bqn(d)1 and a
qme = bqm(e)1. Then q is as desired. The case (d)0 = 1 = (e)0 is similar.
(8) If b : ϕ ∧ ψ → χ then a : ϕ → (ψ → χ), where apnce ≃ bpn〈c, e〉. If b : ϕ → (ψ → χ) then
a : ϕ ∧ ψ → χ, where apnc ≃ bpn(c)0(c)1.
For the first rule, note that apnc is defined for all n, c, p. By (S), it is enough to show that
if p  n =A m, p  (c, d) : ϕ(Fn) and p  (e, f) : ψ(Fn), then there is q ⊇ p such that q 
(ance, amdf) : χ(Fn). We have p  (〈c, e〉, 〈d, f〉) : (ϕ ∧ ψ)(Fn). By induction, there is q ⊇ p such
that q  (bn〈c, e〉, bm〈d, f〉) : χ(Fn). Then q is as required.
The second rule is similar.
(9) a : 0 = S0→ ϕ, where apnb = 0.
Easy. Note that no p forces 0 = S0.
(10) If b : ϕ→ ψ then a : ϕ→ ∀xBψ, for x not free in ϕ.
Suppose that xB is not among xA. Then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are among xA, xB . Let
b : ∀xA∀xB(ϕ→ ψ). Choose a such that apnce ≃ bpnec. We claim that a : ∀xA(ϕ→ ∀xBψ).
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Note that apnc is defined for all n, c, p. By (S), it is enough to show that if p  n =A m
and p  (c, d) : ϕ(Fn) then there is q ⊇ p such that q  (anc, amd) : ∀x
Bψ(Fn). We claim that
p  (anc, amd) : ∀xBψ(Fn). Let q ⊇ p such that q  e =B f . We aim to find r ⊇ q such that r 
(ance, amdf) : ψ(Fn, Fe). By induction, we can find r ⊇ q such that r  (bnec, bmdf) : ψ(Fn, Fe).
Then r is as required.
If xB is among x1, . . . , xk, say x
B is xi, then the free variables of ϕ→ ψ are also among x1, . . . , xk.
Choose a such that apnce ≃ bpn1 . . . ni−1eni+1 . . . nkc. Then a is as desired. The proof is similar.
(11) If b : ϕ→ ψ then a : ∃xBϕ→ ψ, for x not free in ψ.
As in (10), suppose first that xB is not among x1, . . . , xk. Then the free variables of ϕ→ ψ are
among x1, . . . , xk, x. Let b : ∀x1 . . . ∀xk∀x (ϕ→ ψ). Choose a such that a
pnc ≃ bpn(c)0(c)1.
By (S), it is enough to show that if p  n =A m and p  (c, d) : ∃x
Bϕ(Fn, x
B), then there
is q ⊇ p such that q  (anc, amd) : ψ(Fn). As p  (c)0 =B (d)0, there is q ⊇ p such that
q  (bn(c)0, bm(d)0) : ϕ(Fn, F(c)0) → ψ(Fn). As q  ((c)1, (d)1) : ϕ(Fn, F(c)0), we can find r ⊇ q
such that r  (bn(c)0(c)1, bm(d)0(d)1) : ψ(Fn), that is, r  (anc, amd) : ψ(Fn), as desired.
If xB is among x1, . . . , xk, say x
B is xi, then the free variables of ϕ→ ψ are also among x1, . . . , xk.
Choose a such that apnc ≃ bpn1 . . . ni−1(c)0ni+1 . . . nk(c)1. Then a is as desired. The proof is sim-
ilar.
(12) a : ∀xBϕ→ ϕ(α) and a : ϕ(α) → ∃xBϕ, for any term α free for x in ϕ, where apnb ≃ bp(dpn)
and apnb ≃ 〈dpn, b〉 respectively, and dpn ≃ |α(Fn)|p. The index d exists by (V2).
For the first axiom, it is sufficient to show by (S) that if p  n =A m and p  (b, c) : ∀x
Bϕ(Fn, x
B),
then there is q ⊇ p such that q  (anb, amc) : ϕ(Fn, α(Fn)). By (T4), as p  Fn =A Fm, we have
that p  α(Fn) =B α(Fm). Let q ⊇ p be such that q  |α(Fn)| =B |α(Fm)|, that is, q 
dn =B dm. As q  (b, c) : ∀x
Bϕ(Fn, x
B), there is r ⊇ q such that r  (b(dn), c(dm)) : ϕ(Fn, Fdn).
As |Fdrn|r = d
rn = |α(Fn)|r, by (R2) we have that r  (b(dn), c(dm)) : ϕ(Fn, α(Fn)), and thus
r  (anb, amc) : ϕ(Fn, α(Fn)). So r is as required.
For the second axiom, it is sufficient to show by (S) that if p  n =A m and p  (b, c) : ϕ(Fn, α(Fn)),
then there is q ⊇ p such that q  (anb, amc) : ∃xBϕ(Fn, x). By (T4), as p  Fn =A Fm, we have that
p  α(Fn) =B α(Fm). Let q ⊇ p be such that q  |α(Fn)| =B |α(Fm)|, that is, q  dn =B dm. As
q  α(Fn) =B Fdn, by (R2) we have that q  (b, c) : ϕ(Fn, Fdn) and so q  (anb, amc) : ∃x
Bϕ(Fn, x).
(13) a : ¬(0 = Sx) and a : Sx = Sy → x = y, for x, y variables of type N , where apnb = 0.
Easy.
All the axioms from (14) to (18) are given by atomic formulas of the form α(xA) =B β(x
A).
(14) Defining equations of primitive recursive functions.
(15) Combinators: Πxy = x and Σxyz = (xz)(yz).
(16) Recursors: Rxy0 = x and Rxy(z + 1) = y(Rxyz)z at all sensible types
(17) D0(Dxy) = x and D1(Dxy) = y, for x of type A and y of type B
(18) x = D(D0x)(D1x), for x of type A×B
Choose a such that apn = 0 for all n, p. It clearly suffices to prove that (∗) if p  n ∈ A
then p  α(Fn) =B β(Fn). The verification is routine. Consider for instance the axioms for the
recursors.
(16) Rxy0 =B x and Rxy(Sz) =B y(Rxyz)z, for x of type B, y of type B → N → B and z of
type N .
Note that (∗) is equivalent to saying that for every p, if p  n ∈ A, then there is q ⊇ p such that
q  |α(Fn)| =B |β(Fn)|.
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We first claim that if p  a ∈ B and p  b ∈ B → N → B, then for all i there exists q ⊇ p such
that q  |RFaFbFi| ∈ B. Let i = 0. Then |RFaFbF0|p ≃ |R|
pab0. By definition, |R|pab0 = a, and
so p is as desired. Case i + 1. Let q ⊇ p such that q  |RFaFbFi| ∈ B. By assumption, we can
find r ⊇ q such that r  b(|RFaFbFi|q)i ∈ B. On the other hand, |RFaFbFi+1|q ≃ b
q(|R|qabi)i. It
follows that r is as desired.
For the first axiom, suppose that xA is x, y, . . . Let p  n ∈ A. In particular, p  n1 ∈ B.
We claim that p  RFn1Fn20 =B Fn1 . By definition, |R|
pn1n20 = n1. On the other hand,
|RFn1Fn20|p ≃ |R|
pn1n20. By (T3), it follows that p is as desired.
For the second axiom, suppose that xA is x, y, z, . . . Let p  n =A m. In particular, p  n1 ∈ A
and p  n2 ∈ B → N → B. By the claim, there is q ⊇ p such that q  |RFn1Fn2Fn3 | ∈ B. By
the assumption on b, we can find r ⊇ q such that r  n2(|RFn1Fn2Fn3 |qn3 ∈ B. It is not difficult
to check by using the definition of |R| that |RFn1Fn2(SFn3)|r = |Fn2(RFn1Fn2Fn3)Fn3 |r. It follows
by (T3) that r is as desired.
(19) Induction: If b : ϕ(0) and c : ϕ(x)→ ϕ(Sx) then a : ϕ(x), for x of type N , where apn0 ≃ bpn
and apn(i+ 1) ≃ cpni(apni).
We may assume that xA is xB , xN . Let b : ∀xBϕ(0) and c : ∀xB∀xN (ϕ(x) → ϕ(Sx)). We claim
that a : ∀xB∀xNϕ(x).
By (S1), it is enough to show that for all n,m, i, p, if p  n =B m then there is q ⊇ p such
that q  (ani, ami) : ϕ(FBn , F
N
i ). By induction on i. Let i = 0. Fix n,m, p such that p  n =B
m. Then there is q ⊇ p such that q  (bn, bm) : ϕ(Fn, 0). By (R2), q  (bn, bm) : ϕ(Fn, F0).
Thus q  (an0, am0): ϕ(Fn, F0). Suppose this is true for i and let p  n =B m. By induc-
tion, there is q ⊇ p such that q  (ani, ami) : ϕ(Fn, Fi). By definition, we can find r ⊇ q
such that r  (cni(ani), cmi(ami)) : ϕ(Fn, SFi). Since |SFi|r = i + 1, by (R2) we have that
r  (cni(ani), cmi(ami)) : ϕ(Fn, Fi+1), and therefore r  (an(i + 1), am(i + 1)): ϕ(Fn, Fi+1), as
desired.
(20) a : x = x for x of type A, where apn = 0.
Easy.
(21) a : x = y ∨ ¬(x = y) for x and y of type N . We may assume that xA is x, y, . . . Choose a
such that apn1n2 . . . nk = 〈0, 0〉 if n1 = n2, 〈1, 0〉 otherwise.
Easy.
(22) Leibniz: a : xB = yB ∧ ϕ(x) → ϕ(y), for x and y of type B, where apnb = (b)1.
We may assume that xA is x, y . . . Let p  n =A m and p  (b, c) : Fn1 =B Fn2 ∧ ϕ(Fn). By
(S), it suffices to show that there is q ⊇ p such that q  (anb, amc) : ϕ(Fn2 , Fn2 , . . . , Fnk), that is,
q  ((b)1, (c)1) : ϕ(Fn2 , Fn2 , . . . , Fnk). By definition, we have p  ((b)1, (c)1) : ϕ(Fn). On the other
hand, p  ((f)0, (g)0) : Fn1 =B Fn2 , that is, p  Fn1 =B Fn2 . By (R2) the claim follows.
(23) Extensionality: a : ∀zB(xz =C yz)→ x =B→C y, where a
pnb = 0.
In this case A is B → C. We may assume that xA is x, y, . . . Suppose p  n =A m and
p  (b, c) : ∀zB(Fn1z =C Fn2z). By (S), it suffices to show that p  (anb, amc) : Fn1 =B→C Fn2 ,
that is, p  Fn1 =B→C Fn2 . As |Fni |p = ni, it is enough to show that p  n1 =B→C n2. Note that
p  n1, n2 ∈ B → C. By (E3), we just need to show that if q ⊇ p and q  d ∈ B then there is r ⊇ q
such that r  n1d =C n2d. Let q  d ∈ B. As q  (b, c) : ∀z
B(Fn1z = Fn2z), we can find r ⊇ q
such that r  (bd, cd) : Fn1Fd =C Fn2Fd, that is, r  Fn1Fd =C Fn2Fd. By definition, we can find
s ⊇ r such that s  n1d =C n2d.
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(24) Axiom of choice: a : ∀xB∃yCϕ(x, y) → ∃zB→C∀xBϕ(x, zx), where apnb = 〈a0
pnb, a
p
1nb〉,
and apinbd ≃ (b
pd)i.
Let p  n =A m and p  (b, c) : ∀x
B∃yCϕ(Fn, x, y). We claim that
p  (anb, amc) : ∃zB→C∀xBϕ(Fn, x, zx),
that is,
(i) p  a0nb =B→C a0mc
(ii) p  (a1nb, a1mc) : ∀x
Bϕ(Fn, x, Fa0nbx)
For (i), let q ⊇ p and suppose that q  d =B e. As q  (b, c) : ∀x
B∃yCϕ(Fn, x, y), we can
find r ⊇ q such that r  (bd, ce) : ∃yCϕ(Fn, Fd, y). In particular, r  (bd)0 =C (ce)0, and so
r  a0nbd =C a0mce, as desired. This proves (i).
For (ii), let q ⊇ p and suppose that q  d =B e. Since q  (b, c) : ∀x
B∃yCϕ(Fn, x, y), we can find
r ⊇ q such that r  ((bd)1, (ce)1) : ϕ(Fn, Fd, F(bd)0) We claim that
r  (a1nbd, a1mce) : ϕ(Fn, Fd, Fa0nbFd).
Now, |Far
0
nbFd|r ≃ |(a
r
0nb)
rd| ≃ ar0nbd ≃ (b
rd)0 and |F(brd)0 |r = (b
rd)0. By (R2) it follows that
r  ((bd)1, (ce)1) : ϕ(Fn, Fd, Fa0nbFd).
The claim follows. By (S), a is as desired.
(25) Axiom of relativized dependent choice:
a : ∀xB[ϕ(x)→ ∃yB(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))] → ∀xB[ϕ(x) → ∃zN→B(z0 = x ∧ ∀vNψ(zv, z(Sv)))].
For ease of presentation, we assume that xA is empty. Let apbnd ≃ 〈fpbnd, 0, gpbnd〉, where
fpbndi ≃ (hpbndi)0, g
pbndi ≃ (hpbnd(i+ 1))2, and h is such that h
pbnd0 = 〈n, d, 0〉 and
hpbnd(i+ 1) ≃ bp(hpbndi)0(h
pbndi)1.
We claim that a is as desired. Note tha apbnd is defined for all b, n, d, p. We use (S). Suppose
p  (b, c) : ∀xB [ϕ(x) → ∃yB(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], p  n =B m and p  (d, e) : ϕ(Fn). We claim that
p  (abnd, acme) : ∃zN→B(z0 = Fn ∧ ∀v
Nψ(zv, z(Sv)). Note that (apbnd)1 = 0 = (acme)1. It is
thus sufficient to show that:
(i) p  Ffbnd0 =B Fn.
(ii) p  fbnd =N→B fcme
(iii) p  (gbnd, gcme) : ∀vNψ(Ffbndv, Ffbnd(Sv)).
Since p  n ∈ B, |Ffpnd0|p ≃ f
pnd0, and fpnd0 = n, we have by (T4) that p  Ffbnd0 =B Fn,
and so (i) holds. It remains to show (ii) and (iii). To this end, we claim that for all q ⊇ p and
for all i there is r ⊇ q such that r  fbndi =B fcmei and r  ((hbndi)10, (hcmei)10) : ϕ(Ffbndi).
By induction on i. Let i = 0 and q ⊇ p. It is easy to see that q is as desired. In fact, by
monotonicity, q  n =B m and q  (d, e) : ϕ(Fn). On the other hand, we have that f
qbnd0 = n,
f qcme0 = m, (hqbnd0)10 = d and (h
qcme0)10 = e. This proves i = 0. Suppose this is true for i.
Let us prove that claim for i + 1. Let q ⊇ p. By induction, let r ⊇ q satisfy the claim for i. As
r  (b, c) : ∀xB[ϕ(x) → ∃yB(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], it follows from the definition of h that there is s ⊇ r
such that s  (hbnd(i + 1), hcme(i + 1)): ∃yB(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(Ffbndi, y)), and so s is as required. This
proves the claim.
Clearly, (ii) follows directly from the claim. For (iii), let q ⊇ p and i be given. We aim to
show that there is r ⊇ q such that r  (gbndi, gcmei) : ψ(FfbndFi, Ffbnd(SFi)). By the claim, we
can find r ⊇ q such that r  fbndi =B fcmei and r  ((hbndi)10, (hcmei)10) : ϕ(Ffbndi). As r 
(b, c) : ∀xB[ϕ(x) → ∃yB(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], it follows from the definition of h that there is s ⊇ r such
that s  (hbnd(i+1), hcme(i+1)): ∃yB(ϕ(y)∧ψ(Ffbndi, y)), and so s  (gbndi, gcmei) : ψ(Ffbndi, Ffbnd(i+1)).
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As usual, by (R2), we have that s  (gbndi, gcmei) : ψ(FfbndFi, Ffbnd(SFi)), and hence s is as re-
quired. This completes the proof of (iii). 
Theorem 4.2 (Self-realizability of first-order formulas). Let ϕ be a first-order formula of L with
free variables among the distinct variables x1, . . . , xk. Then there exist a nonempty set T of finite
partial functions and an index a such that:
• If ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k) is true, then for all p ∈ T there exists q ⊇ p such that
q  an1 . . . nk : ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k)
• If p  (b, c) : ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k), then ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k) is true.
In particular, if ϕ is a first-order sentence, then there exists a nonempty set T of finite partial
functions such that:
• if ϕ is true, then for every p ∈ T there exist q ⊇ p and an index a such that q  a : ϕ
• if p  (b, c) : ϕ, then ϕ is true
Proof. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕl be an enumeration of all subformulas of ϕ. After renaming of bound variables,
if necessary, we can choose distinct variables xj = xj1, . . . , x
j
kj
listing all of the free variables of ϕj
so that if ϕj is ψ ◦χ then x
j are the variables for both ψ and χ and if ϕj is Qxψ then x
j, x are the
variables for ψ. We can safely assume that x1, . . . , xk are the variables for ϕ
Let T be the set of all finite functions p such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , l} and for all 〈j, n1, . . . , nkj 〉 ∈
dom(p), if ϕj is of the form ψ0 ∨ ψ1 then either p(〈j, n1, . . . , nkj〉) = 0 and ψ0(n¯1, . . . , n¯kj ) is
true, or p(〈j, n1, . . . , nkj 〉) = 1 and ψ1(n¯1, . . . , n¯kj) is true, and if ϕj is of the form ∃xψ, then
ψ(n¯1, . . . , n¯kj , m¯) is true, where m = p(〈j, n1, . . . nkj〉).
By induction on every subformula ψ of ϕ, we prove that every ϕj has an index a with respect
to variables xj .
For the sake of brevity we write n for n1 . . . nkj . Similarly, we write ψ(n¯) for ψ(n¯1, . . . , n¯kj) and
p(j, n) for p(〈j, n1, . . . , nkj〉).
(1) Suppose ψ is α =N β. Let a
pn = 0 for all p, n.
For every first-order closed term α there exists a number |α| such that |α|p = |α| for all p. Indeed,
|α| is the interpretation of α in the standard model. Therefore, for any first-order closed terms α
and β, α = β is true iff |α| = |β|. We thus have that ψ(n¯) is true iff |α(n¯)| = |β(n¯)|. On the other
hand, p  (b, c) : ψ(n¯) iff p  ψ(n¯) iff |α(n¯)| = |β(n¯)|. This proves (1).
(2) Suppose ψ is ψ0 ∧ ψ1. Let a
pn ≃ 〈ap0n, a
p
1n〉, where ai are indices for ψi.
Suppose ψ(n¯) is true and p ∈ T . Then ψi(n¯) is true for every i < 2. By induction, we can find
q ⊇ p such that q  aqin : ψi(n¯). Then q  an : ψ(n¯).
If p  (b, c) : ψ(n¯), then by induction ψ0(n¯) and ψ1(n¯) are both true, and so is ψ(n¯).
(3) Suppose ψ = ϕj is ψ0 ∨ ψ1. Let ai be an index for ψi. Choose a such that for all n and for
all p ∈ T ,
apn ≃
{
〈0, ap0n〉 if p(j, n) = 0
〈1, ap1n〉 if p(j, n) = 1
Suppose ψ(n¯) is true and p ∈ T . If p(j, n) is defined, say p(j, n) = 0, then ψ0(n¯) is true and
by induction there is q ⊇ p such that q  a0n : ψ0(n¯). Then a
qn = 〈0, aq0n〉 and q  an : ψ(n¯).
Suppose p(j, n) is undefined. Since ψ(n¯) is true, either ψ0(n¯) is true or ψ1(n¯) is true. Say ψ1(n¯) is
true. Let q ⊇ p be such that q(j, n) = 1. Then q ∈ T . By induction, there exists r ⊇ q such that
r  a1n : ψ1(n¯). As before, r  an : ψ(n¯).
If p  (b, c) : ψ(n¯), then by induction either ψ0(n¯) is true or ψ1(n¯) is true, and so is ψ(n¯).
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(4) Suppose ψ is ψ0 → ψ1. Let a
pnb ≃ ap1n, where a1 is an index for ψ1.
Suppose ψ(n¯) is true. Let p ∈ T . Note that apn is defined. We claim that p  an : ψ(n¯). Let
q ⊇ p and suppose that q  (b, c) : ψ0(n¯). By induction, ψ0(n¯) is true and so is ψ1(n¯). By induction
there is r ⊇ q such that r  a1n : ψ1(n¯). Then r  (anb, anc) : ψ1(n¯).
Suppose p  (b, c) : ψ(n¯). Let us show that ψ(n¯) is true. Suppose ψ0(n¯) is true. We aim to show
that ψ1(n¯) is true. By induction, there is q ⊇ p such that q  a0n : ψ0(n¯). By definition, there is
r ⊇ q such that, e.g, r  ba0n : ψ1(n¯). By induction, ψ1(n¯) is true, as desired.
(5) Suppose ψ = ϕj is ∃xψ0. Let a
pn ≃ 〈p(j, n), ap0np(j, n)〉.
Suppose ψ(n¯) is true and let p ∈ T . If p(j, n) is defined, then ψ0(n¯, m¯), where m = p(j, n), is
true. By induction there is q ⊇ p such that q  a0nm : ψ0(n¯, m¯). By (R3), as |m¯|p = |F
N
m |p, we
have q  a0nm : ψ0(n¯, Fm) and hence q  an : ψ(n¯). If p(j, n) is not defined, let m be such that
ψ0(n¯, m¯) is true. Such m exists by hypothesis. Extend p to a function q such that q(j, n) = m.
Then q ∈ T . By induction there is r ⊇ q such that r  a0nm : ψ0(n¯, m¯). As before, r  an : ψ(n¯).
If p  (b, c) : ψ(n¯), then p  ((b)1, (c)1) : ψ0(n¯, Fm), where m = (b)0. As before, |Fm|p = m =
|m¯|p. Therefore p  ((b)1, (c)1) : ψ0(n¯, m¯). By induction ψ0(n¯, m¯) is true and so is ψ(n¯).
(6) Suppose ψ is ∀xψ0. Let a
pnm ≃ ap0nm, where a0 is an index for ψ0. Choose a such that a
pn
is always defined.
Suppose ψ(n¯) is true. Let p ∈ T . We claim that p  an : ψ(n¯). We just need to show that for all
m and for all q ⊇ p there is r ⊇ q such that r  anm : ψ(m¯, FNm ). Let m, q be given. Since ψ(n¯) is
true, so is ψ0(n¯, m¯). By induction, there is r ⊇ q such that r  a0nm : ψ0(n¯, m¯). The claim follows
as in (5).
Finally, suppose p  (b, c) : ψ(n¯). Let m be given. By definition, there is q ⊇ p such that
q  (bn, cm) : ψ(n¯, Fm). Since |Fm|q = m = |m¯|q, we thus have that q  (bn, cm) : ψ(n¯, m¯). By
induction, ψ(n¯, m¯) is true. This shows that ψ(n¯) is true. 
Formalizing the above proofs in HA, we obtain Goodman’s theorem for E-HAω + AC+ DC.
Theorem 4.3. E-HAω + AC+ DC is conservative over HA.
5. Realizing choice and extensionality
We provide a realizability interpretation a : ϕ such that for every sentence ϕ of L, if
E-HAω + AC+ DC ⊢ ϕ,
then there exists an index a such that
HA ⊢ a : ϕ.
The idea is to combine HEO with a version of Kleene recursive realizability whose realizers are
elements of HEO.
E-HAω + AC+ DC ⊢ ϕ
HEO + Kleene
−−−−−−−−−→ HA ⊢ a : ϕ
One can also define a realizability notion that combines Kreisel’s modified realizability with the
HEO interpretation. This way also independence of premise for ∃-free formulas [7, Section 5.1] is
realizable. Warning: we write a : ϕ for ease of notation, although the meaning is different from
Section 4.
As before, the discussion is informal. The reader will convince himself that all the definitions
and proofs can be carried out in HA.
Convention. We write, e.g., ab =A cd for ab and cd are defined and ab =A cd. Similarly for
ab ∈ A and ab : ϕ.
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(1) For numbers a, b and type A, we define a =A b such that (A,=A) is a model of E-HA
ω, where
a ∈ A means a =A a. By recursion on A.
• a =N b iff a = b
• a =A×B b iff (a)0 =A (b)0 and (a)1 =B (b)1
• a =A→B b iff n =A m implies an =B bm
This a version of HEO. Properties: (E1) Reflexivity. If a =A b then a, b ∈ A. By definition, if
a ∈ A then a =A a. Symmetry and transitivity. (E2) a =A→B b iff a, b ∈ A→ B and for all n ∈ A,
an =B bn. (E3) For every type A there is a number 0
A ∈ A. Let 0N = 0, 0A×B = 〈0A, 0B〉, and
0A→B be an index for the function λn.0B .
(2) Let L∗ be the language L of HAω plus a constant FAa of type A for every a ∈ A. We simply
write Fa when the type is clear from the context. Let us define the value |α| of a closed term α of
L∗ by recursion on α:
• |0| = 0
• |S| = Λn.n+ 1 is any index for the function λn.n+ 1.
• |g(α1, . . . , αk)| ≃ g(|α1|, . . . , |αk|), for g primitive recursive and αi of type N
• |Π| = Λab.a
• |Σ| = Λabn.(an)(bn)
• |R| is such that |R|ab0 = a and |R|(a, b, n + 1) ≃ b(|R|abn, n)
• |D| = Λab.〈a, b〉
• |D0| = Λa.(a)0 and |D1| = Λa.(a)1
• |αβ| ≃ {|α|}(|β|)
• |FAa | = a
|R| exists by the recursion theorem. Properties. (V1) For every closed term α of type A, the
number |α| is defined. (V2) For any term α with variables among the distinct variables x1, . . . , xk,
there exists an index d such that for all n1, . . . , nk, dn1 . . . nk ≃ |α(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk)|.
For α and β closed terms of type A, we define α =A β iff |α| =A |β|. In particular, α ∈ A iff
|α| ∈ A.
Properties. (T1) For every closed term α of type A, α ∈ A (easy induction on α). (T2) If γ(xA)
is a term of type B, α and β are closed terms of type A, and α =A β, then γ(α) =B γ(β). In
particular, if |α| = |β| then γ(α) =B γ(β).
(3) Type of a formula. We define the type of a formula ϕ of L∗ as follows. The type of an atomic
formula is N . Suppose ϕ has type A and ψ has type B. Then the type of ϕ ∧ ψ and ∃xAψ(x) is
A×B. The type of ϕ ∨ ψ is N ×A×B. The type of ϕ→ ψ and ∀xAψ(x) is A→ B. Note that if
ϕ(x) has type A, so does ϕ(α). If ϕ has type A, we write ϕA.
(4) Realizability. For a number a and a sentence ϕ of L∗ we define a : ϕ by recursion on ϕ:
• Atomic case: a : α =A β iff α =A β (iff |α| =A |β|)
• a : ϕ ∧ ψ iff (a)0 : ϕ and (a)1 : ψ
• a : ϕA ∨ ψB iff a ∈ N ×A×B and either (a)0 = 0 and (a)1 : ϕ or (a)0 = 1 and (a)2 : ψ
• a : ϕA → ψB iff a ∈ A→ B and if b : ϕ then ab : ψ,
• a : ∃xAϕ(x) iff (a)0 ∈ A and (a)1 : ϕ(F
A
(a)0
).
• a : ∀xAϕB(x) iff a ∈ A→ B and if n ∈ A then an : ϕ(FAn ),
The clause for ∨ bears similarity with Kreisel’s modified realizability. One could introduce disjoint
types to deal with ∨. We prefer this solution.
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Properties. (R1) a : ϕA implies a ∈ A (by induction on ϕ). (R2) If α =A β and a : ϕ(α), then
a : ϕ(β).
Proof of (R2). By induction on ϕ. For the atomic case we have to show that if α =A β and
γ(α) =B δ(α) then γ(β) =B δ(β). It follows from (T2) and the transitivity of =B . The inductive
cases are straightforward. 
In the proof of the soundness we use the following property to verify that a : ϕ.
(S) Let ϕ be ∀x1 . . . ∀xk(ϕ1 → . . .→ ϕl+1). Say xi has type Ai and ϕi has type Bi.
• Suppose a : ϕ. If ni =Ai mi for i = 1, . . . , k, bi =Bi ci and bi : ϕi(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk) for i =
1, . . . , l, then an1 . . . nkb1 . . . bl =Bl+1 am1 . . . mkc1 . . . cl and
an1 . . . nkb1 . . . bl : ϕl+1(Fn1 , . . . Fnk).
• Suppose an1 . . . nkb1 . . . bl−1 is defined for all ni, bi. Moreover, suppose that if ni =Ai mi for
i = 1, . . . , k, bi =Bi ci and bi : : ϕi(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk) for i = 1, . . . , l, then an1 . . . nkb1 . . . bl =Bl+1
am1 . . . mkc1 . . . cl and
an1 . . . nkb1 . . . bl : ϕl+1(Fn1 , . . . Fnk).
Then a : ϕ.
Also consider the following instances of (S).
(S1) Let ϕ be ∀x1 . . . ∀xkϕ. Say xi has type Ai and ϕ has type B. Then a : ϕ iff for all ni,mi such
that ni =Ai mi for i = 1, . . . , k, we have that an1 . . . nk =B am1 . . . mk and an1 . . . nk : ϕ(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk).
(S2) Let ϕ be ϕ1 → . . .→ ϕl → ϕl+1. Say ϕi has type Bi.
• Suppose a : ϕ, bi =Bi ci and bi : ϕi for all i = 1, . . . , l. Then ab1 . . . bl =Bl+1 ac1 . . . cl and
ab1 . . . bl : ϕl+1.
• Suppose that ab1 . . . bl−1 is defined for all bi. Moreover, suppose that whenever bi =Bi ci
and bi : : ϕi for all i = 1, . . . , l, then ab1 . . . bl =Bl+1 ac1 . . . cl and ab1 . . . bl : ϕl+1. Then
a : ϕ.
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness). Suppose ϕ is a formula of L of type B such that E-HAω+AC+DC ⊢ ϕ.
If the free variables of ϕ are among the distinct variables x1, . . . , xk, then there exists an index a
such that a : ∀x1 . . . ∀xkϕ. In particular, if ϕ is a sentence, then there is an index a such that a : ϕ.
Proof. The indices are mostly the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Only the indices for axioms
and rules involving ∨, that is, (5), (7), and (21), are slightly different. The bulk of the proof is to
check that the indices have the right type. The verification is routine. For the sake of completeness,
we write down the details.
Assume xi is of type Ai. For the sake of brevity, we write A for A1, . . . , Ak and x
A for x1, . . . , xk.
For the remainder of the proof we assume that the free variables of ϕ are among xA. We thus
write a : ∀xAϕ or simply a : ϕ for a : ∀x1 . . . ∀xkϕ. We write, e.g., n for n1 . . . nk so that an stands
for an1 . . . nk and n =A m stands for n1 =A1 m1, . . . , nk =Ak mk. Similarly, we write ϕ(Fn) for
ϕ(Fn1 , . . . , Fnk). Let A→ B denote A1 → A2 → . . .→ Ak → B.
We repeatedly use (S) to show that a : ϕ.
(1) a : ϕB → ϕB , where anb = b.
It is easy to see that a ∈ A→ B → B is an index for ϕ→ ϕ.
(2) Modus ponens: if c : ϕC and b : ϕC → ψD then a : ψD.
Suppose that there are variables, say xB , that occur free in ϕ but are not among xA. Then the
free variables of ϕ and ϕ → ψ are among xA, xB . By induction, let c ∈ A → B → C be an index
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for ϕ and b ∈ A → B → C → D be an index for ϕ → ψ. Choose a such that an ≃ bn0B(cn0B),
where 0B ∈ B are fixed. We claim that a ∈ A→ D is as desired.
By (S1), let us check that if n =A m then an =D am and an : ψ(Fn). Clearly, 0
B =B 0
B . By
induction, cn0B =C cm0
B , cn0B : ϕ(Fn, F0B ), bn0
B =C→D bm0
B , and bn0B : ϕ(Fn, F0B )→ ψ(Fn).
It thus follows that bn0B(cn0B) =D bm0
B(cm0B), that is an =D am, and bn0
B(cn0B) : ψ(Fn),
that is, an : ψ(Fn), as desired.
(3) Syllogism: if c : ϕC → ψD and b : ψD → χE then a : ϕC → χE.
Suppose that there are variables, say xB , that occur free in ψ but are not among xA. By
induction, let c ∈ A→ B → C → D be an index for ϕ→ ψ and b ∈ A→ B → D → E be an index
for ψ → χ. Choose a such that and ≃ bn0B(cn0Bd). We claim that a ∈ A→ C → E is as desired.
By (S), it is enough show that if n =A m, d =C e and d : ϕ(Fn) then and =E ame and and : χ(Fn).
By induction, cn0Bd =D cm0
Be and cn0Bd : ψ(Fn). On the other hand, bn0
B =D→E bm0
B and
bn0B : (ψ → χ)(Fn). It thus follows that bn0
B(cn0Bd) =E bm0
B(cm0Be), that is, and =E ame,
and bn0B(cn0Bd) : χ(Fn), that is, and : χ(Fn).
(4) ai : ψ0 ∧ ψ1 → ψi, where anb = (b)i. Say ψi has type Bi.
Let us show that ai ∈ A→ B0×B1 → Bi is as desired. By (S), it suffices to show that if n =A m,
b =B0×B1 c and b : (ψ0 ∧ ψ1)(Fn) then anb =Bi amc and anb : ψi(Fn). Easy. The conlusion follows
immediately from the definitions of equality and realizability for product types.
(5) ai : ψi → ψ0 ∨ ψ1. Say ψi has type Bi.
Case i = 0. Choose a such that anb = 〈0, b, 0B1〉. Let us show that a ∈ A→ B0 → N×B0×B1 is
as desired. Suppose n =A m, b =B0 c and b : ψ0(Fn). By (S), it suffices to show that anb =N×B0×B1
amc and anb : (ψ0 ∨ ψ1)(Fn). Easy. The conclusion follows from the definitions of equality for
product types and realizability for disjunctions.
The case i = 1 is similar. Choose a such that anb = 〈1, 0B0 , b〉.
(6) If b : χB → ϕC and c : χB → ψD then a : χB → (ϕC ∧ ψD), where and ≃ 〈bnd, cnd〉.
First, note that the free variables of the premises are among xA. By induction, let c ∈ A →
B → C and b ∈ A → B → D be indices for χ → ϕ and χ → ψ respectively. Let us show that
a ∈ A → B → C ×D is as desired. Since an is defined for all n, it is enough to show by (S) that
if n =A m, d =B e and d : χ(Fn) then and =C×D ame and and : (ϕ∧ψ)(Fn). This is straightforward.
(7) If b : ϕB → χD and c : ψC → χD then a : ϕB ∨ ψC → χD, where
and ≃
{
bn(d)1 if (d)0 = 0
cn(d)2 otherwise
We claim that a ∈ A → N × B × C → D is as desired. Note that an is defined for all n. By
(S), it suffices to show that if n =A m, d =N×B×C e and d : (ϕ ∨ ψ)(Fn) then and =D ame and
and : χ(Fn). Supose (d)0 = 0. The other case is similar. Then (d)1 =B (e)1 and (d)1 : ϕ(Fn). By in-
duction, bn(d)1 =D bn(e)1, that is, and =D ame, and bn(d)1 : χ(Fn), that is, and : χ(Fn), as desired.
(8) If b : ϕB∧ψC → χD then a : ϕB → (ψC → χD), where ance ≃ bn〈c, e〉. If b : ϕB → (ψC → χD)
then a : ϕB ∧ ψC → χD, where anc ≃ bn(c)0(c)1.
For the first rule, let us show that a ∈ A→ B → C → D is as desired. Note tha anc is defined
for all n, c. By (S), it suffices to show that if n =A m, c =B d with c : ϕ(Fn), and e =C f with
e : ψ(Fn), then ance =D amdf and ance : χ(Fn). Straightforward.
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The second rule is similar.
(9) a : 0 = S0→ ϕB , where anb = 0.
Then a ∈ A→ N → B is an index for 0 = S0→ ϕ. Not that no b realizes 0 = S0.
(10) If b : ϕC → ψD then a : ϕC → ∀xBψD, for x not free in ϕ.
Suppose xB is not among xA. Then the free variables of ϕ→ ψ are among xA, xB . By induction,
let b : A→ B → C → D be an index for ϕ → ψ. Choose a such that ance ≃ bnec. We claim that
a ∈ A→ C → B → D is an index for ϕ→ ∀xψ.
Note that anc is defined for all n, c. By (S), it is enough to show that is n =A m, c =C d
and c : ϕ(Fn), then anc =B→D amd and anc : ∀xψ(Fn, x). Suppose e =B f . We aim to show
that ance =D amdf and ance : ψ(Fn, Fe). By induction, bnec =D bmfd and bnec : ψ(Fn, Fe). By
definition, a is as required.
If xB is among x1, . . . , xk, say x
B is xi, then the free variables of ϕ→ ψ are also among x1, . . . , xk.
Choose a such that ance ≃ bn1 . . . ni−1eni+1 . . . nkc. Then a is as desired. The proof is similar.
(11) If b : ϕC → ψD then a : ∃xBϕC → ψD, for x not free in ψ.
Suppose that xB is not among xA. Then the free variables of ϕ → ψ are among xA, xB . By
induction, let b ∈ A→ B → C → D be an index for ϕ→ ψ. Choose a such that anc ≃ bn(c)0(c)1.
We claim that a ∈ A→ B × C → D is as desired.
By (S), it is enough to show that if n =A m, c =B×C d and c : ∃x
Bϕ(Fn, x), then anc =D amd
and anc : ψ(Fn). By assumption, (c)0 =B (d)0, (c)1 =C (d)1 and (c)1 : ϕ(Fn, F(c)0). By induction,
bn(c)0(c)1 =D bm(d)0(d)1 and bn(c)0(c)1 : ψ(Fn). By definition, a is as required.
If xB is among x1, . . . , xk, say x
B is xi, then the free variables of ϕ→ ψ are also among x1, . . . , xk.
Choose a such that anc ≃ bn1, . . . , ni−1, (c)0, ni+1, . . . , nk(c)1). Then a is as desired. The proof is
similar.
(12) a : ∀xBϕC → ϕC(α) and a : ϕC(α) → ∃xBϕC , for any term α free for xB in ϕ, where
anb ≃ b(dn) and anb ≃ 〈dn, b〉 respectively, and dn ≃ |α(Fn)|. The index d exists by (V2).
Let us check that a ∈ A → (B → C) → C is an index for the first axiom. By (S), it suffices
to show that if n =A m, b =B→C c and b : ∀x
Bϕ(Fn, x), then anb =C amc and anb : ϕ(Fn, α(Fn)).
By assumption, Fn =A Fm and hence by (T2) we have that α(Fn) =B α(Fm), that is, dn =B dm.
By the assumption on b, it follows that b(dn)Cb(dm) and b(dn) : ϕ(Fn, Fdn). As Fdn =B α(Fn), by
(R2) we have that b(dn) : ϕ(Fn, α(Fn)). By definition, a is as required.
For the second axiom, let us check that a ∈ A→ C → B ×C is as desired. By (S), it suffices to
show that if n =A m, b =C c and b : ϕ(Fn, α(Fn)), then anb =B×C amc and anb : ∃x
Bϕ(Fn, x), that
is, dn =B dm, b =C c, dn ∈ B and b : ϕ(Fn, Fdn). It is clearly enough to prove that dn =B dm and
b : ϕ(Fn, Fdn). As before, α(Fn) =B α(Fm), that is, dn =B dm. Also, α(Fn) =B Fdn, and hence by
(R2) it follows that b : ϕ(Fn, Fdn), as required.
(13) a : ¬(0 = Sx) and a : Sx = Sy → x = y, for x, y variables of type N , where anb = 0.
Easy.
All the axioms from (14) to (18) are given by atomic formulas (type N). Choose a such that
an = 0 for all n. It is routine to check that a ∈ A→ N is as required.
(19) Induction: If b : ϕC(0) and c : vpC(x) → ϕC(Sx) then a : ϕC(x), for x of type N , where
an0 ≃ bn and an(i+ 1) ≃ cni(ani).
We may assume that xA is xB, xN . By induction, let b ∈ B → C be an index for ϕ(0) and
c ∈ A→ C → C be an index for ϕ(x) → ϕ(x+ 1). We claim that a ∈ A→ C is an index for ϕ(x).
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By (S1), it is enough to show that for all n,m, i, if n =B m then ani =C ami and ani : ϕ(Fn, Fi).
By induction on i. Let i = 0. By induction, bn =C bm and bn : ϕ(Fn, 0). By (R2), bn : ϕ(Fn, F0).
Since an0 = bn and am0 = bm, we are done. Suppose this is true for i and let us prove the
claim for i + 1. By the assumption, cni =C→C cmi and cni : ϕ(Fn, Fi) → ϕ(Fn, SFi). It follows
from the induction hypothesis that cni(ani) =C cmi(ami) and cni(ani) : ϕ(Fn, SFi). By (R2),
cni(ani) : ϕ(Fn, Fi+1). The claim follows from the definition of a.
(20) a : x = x for x of type A, where an = 0. Then a ∈ A→ N is an index for x = x.
Easy.
(21) a : x = y ∨ ¬(x = y) for x of type N .
We may assume that xA is x, y, . . . Choose a such that an = 〈0, 0, b〉 if n1 = n2, and an = 〈1, 0, b〉
otherwise, where bc = 0 for all c. Let us show that a ∈ A→ N ×N × (N → N) is as desired. Let
B = N ×N × (N → N). Note that b ∈ N → N .
By (S), it is sufficient to show that if n =A m then an =B am and an : Fn1 = Fn2∨¬(Fn1 = Fn2).
Here we use the fact that equality between natural numbers is decidable. Suppose n1 = n2. As
n =A m, we have that m1 = m2 and so an = 〈0, 0, b〉 = am. It follows that an =B am. On
the other hand, 0: Fn1 = Fn2 , and therefore an is as desired. Suppose n1 6= n2. As n =A m,
it follows that m1 6= m2 and so an = 〈1, 0, b〉 = am. As before, an =B am. It remains to
show that an is a realizer, that is, b : ¬(Fn1 = Fn2). Since b ∈ N → N , it is sufficient to show that
if c : Fn1 = Fn2 then bc : 0 = S0. Since c : Fn1 = Fn2 iff n1 = n2, the conclusion follows from ex falso.
(22) Leibniz: a : x =B y ∧ ϕ
C(x)→ ϕC(y), where anb = (b)1.
We may assume that xA is x, y, . . . Let us show that a ∈ A → N × C → C is as desired. Let
n =A m, b =N×C c and b : Fn1 =B Fn2 ∧ ϕ(Fn). By (S), we aim to show that anb =C amc and
anb : ϕ(Fn2 , Fn2 , . . . , Fnk). The first part is straightforward. For the second part, we have by the
assumption that (b)0 : Fn1 =B Fn2 , that is, n1 =B n2, and (b)1 : ϕ(Fn). Then anb : ϕ(Fn). The
conclusion follows from (R2).
(23) Extensionality: a : ∀zB(xz =C yz)→ x =B→C y, where anb = 0.
We may assume that xA is x, y, . . . Let us check that a ∈ A→ (B → N)→ N is as desired. Sup-
pose n =A m, b =B→N c and b : ∀z
B(Fn1z =C Fn2z). By (S), it is sufficient to show that anb = amc
and anb : Fn1 =B→C Fn2 , that is n1 =B→C n2. The first part is trivial, since anb = 0 = amc. For
the second part, note that n1, n2 ∈ B → C. By (E2), it is sufficient to show that if d ∈ B then
n1d =C n2d. By the assumption, if d ∈ B then bd : Fn1Fd =C Fn2Fd. It follows that n1d =C n2d,
as desired.
(24) Axiom of choice: a : ∀xB∃yC0ϕC1(x, y)→ ∃zB→C0∀xBϕC1(x, zx), where anb = 〈a0nb, a1nb〉,
and ainbd ≃ (bd)i. We claim that
a ∈ A→ (B → C0 × C1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
→ (B → C0)× (B → C1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
is as desired. Note that anb is defined everywhere. Let n =A m, b =D c and b : ∀x∃yϕ(Fn, x, y).
By (S), it is sufficient to show (i) anb =E amc, that is, ainb =B→Ci aimc for i < 2, and (ii)
anb : ∃z∀xϕ(Fn, x, zx).
Let us prove (i). Let d =B e. From b =D c we have that bd =C0×C1 ce, and so (bd)i =Ci (ce)i.
By the definition of ai, we thus have ainbd =Ci aimce. To prove (ii), since a0nb ∈ B → C0 by
(i), it is enough to show that a1nb : ∀xϕ(Fn, x, Fa0nbx). Similarly, since a1nb ∈ B → C1 by (i), it
is enough to show that for all d ∈ B, a1nbd : ϕ(Fn, Fd, Fa0nbFd). As b : ∀x
B∃yC0ϕC1(Fn, x, y), we
have that (bd)1 : ϕ(Fn, Fd, F(bd)0). Now, a1nbd = (bd)1 and |Fa0nbFd| = a0nbd = (bd)0 = |F(bd)0 |. It
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follows from (T2) and (R2) that a1nbd is as required.
(25) Axiom of relativized dependent choice:
a : ∀xB[ϕC(x)→ ∃yB(ϕC(y) ∧ ψD(x, y))]→ ∀xB[ϕC(x)→ ∃zN→B(z0 =B x ∧ ∀v
NψD(zv, z(Sv)))].
For simplicity, suppose that xA is empty. Let abnd ≃ 〈fbnd, 0, gbnd〉, where fbndi ≃ (hbndi)0,
gbndi ≃ (hbnd(i + 1))2, and h is such that hbnd0 = 〈n, d, 0〉 and hbnd(i + 1) ≃ b(hbndi)0(hbndi)1.
We claim that
a ∈ (B → C → B × C ×D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
→ B → C → (N → B)×N × (N → D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
is as desired. Note that abnd is defined everywhere. By (S), it is sufficient to show that if b =E c,
b : ∀x[ϕ(x) → ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], n =B m, d =C e and d : ϕ(Fn), then abnd =F acme and
abnd : ∃z(z0 =B Fn ∧ ∀vψ(zv, z(Sv))). Note that (abnd)1 = 0 = (acme)1. It is thus sufficient to
show that:
(i) Ffbnd0 =B Fn
(ii) fbnd =N→B fcme
(iii) gbnd =N→D gcme and gbnd : ∀vψ(Ffbndv, Ffbnd(Sv))
Item (i) follows from (T2). In fact, |Ffbnd0| ≃ fbnd0 and by definition fbnd0 = n. It remains to
show (ii) and (iii). We claim that for all i:
(a) fbndi =B fcmei
(b) (hbndi)1 =C (hcmei)1
(c) (hbndi)1 : ϕ(Ffbndi)
By induction on i. Let i = 0. We have that fbnd0 = n, fcme0 = m, (hbnd0)1 = d and (hcme0)10 =
e. It follows from the assumptions n =B m, d =C e and d : ϕ(Fn) that (a)–(c) hold true for
i = 0. Suppose the claim is true for i. Let us prove the claim for i + 1. By the induction
hypothesis and the assumptions b =E c and b : ∀x
B[ϕ(x) → ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y))], it follows that
b(fbndi)(hbndi)1 =B×C×D c(fcmei)(hcmei)1 and b(fbndi)(hbndi)1 : ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(Ffbndi, y)). By
the definition of h, we thus have hbnd(i+1) =B×C×D hcme(i+1), and so (a) and (b) hold true for
i+ 1, and hbnd(i+ 1): ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(Ffbndi, y)), and hence (c) holds true for i+ 1. This completes
the proof of the claim.
Clearly, (ii) follows from (a). Finally, let us prove (iii), that is, for all i, gbndi =D gcmei
and gbndi : ψ(FfbndFi, Ffbnd(SFi)). Let i be given. As in the proof of the claim, we have that
hbnd(i+ 1) =B×C×D hcme(i+ 1) and hbnd(i+ 1): ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(Ffbndi, y)). By the definition of g,
we thus have that gbndi =D gcmei, as desired, and gbndi : ψ(Ffbndi, Ffbnd(i+1)). By (R2), it follows
that gbndi : ψ(FfbndFi, Ffbnd(SFi)). 
We can formalize the above proof in HA. We thus obtain:
Theorem 5.2. Let ϕ be a sentence of L. If E-HAω + AC+ DC ⊢ ϕ then there is an index a such
that HA ⊢ a : ϕ.
5.1. Remarks. One can define a Goodman version p  a : ϕ of this realizability notion. For
instance, the clause for implication would be
• p  a : ϕA → ψB iff p  a ∈ A→ B and for all q ⊇ p and for all b, if q  b : ϕA then there
is r ⊇ q such that r  ab : ψB .
This interpretation is sound, that is, for every sentence ϕ provable in E-HAω + AC + DC and for
every definable set T of partial functions there is an index a such that HA ⊢ ∀p ∈ T p  a : ϕ.
However, the self-realizability theorem fails in HA. Let us see what goes wrong.
Suppose we want to prove that for every first-order formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) of type B there exist
a set T of finite functions and an index a such that:
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(i) For all n and for all p ∈ T there is q ⊇ p such that q  an ∈ B.
(ii) If ϕ(n¯) is true, then for all p ∈ T there is q ⊇ p such that q  an : ϕ(n¯)
(iii) If p  b : ϕ(n¯) then ϕ(n¯) is true,
where n = n1 . . . nk and ϕ(n¯) is ϕ(n¯1, . . . , n¯k). Choose T as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof
goes smoothly except for ∨ and ∃. In fact, we need classical logic to prove (i), and so we cannot
formalize the proof in HA. Note however that the argument can be carried out in PA. In more
detail, consider ψj = ψ0 ∨ ψ1, with ψi of type Bi. Suppose ai works for ψi. Let
apn ≃
{
〈0, ap0n, 0
B1〉 if p(j, n) = 0
〈1, 0B0 , ap1n〉 if p(j, n) = 1
Fix n, p. By induction we can find q ⊇ p such that ai
qn is defined for every i < 2. However we
cannot prove that there is an extension of q in T which is defined on j, n. In fact, we should be
able to decide whether ψ0(n¯) ∨ ψ1(n¯) is true. Similarly, if ψ = ∃xψ0 and a is as in the proof of
Theorem 4.2, then we cannot prove that for all n and p there is q ⊇ p such that aqn is defined. In
fact, as before, we should be able to decide whether ∃xψ0(n¯) is true.
Note
After submitting the paper, the author was informed by Fernando Ferreira of a recent work by
Benno van den Berg and Lotte van Slooten [10] on Goodman’s theorem. Combining different ideas
from previous proofs, in particular Lavalette [4], they give another proof of Goodman’s theorem
and its extensional version. To do so, they define the system HAP, a variant of Beeson’s EON
(Elementary theory of Operations and Numbers) and Troelstra’s APP, which is a conservative
extension of HA based on the logic of partial terms introduced by Beeson [2]. They then show that
(1) if HAω+AC ⊢ ϕ then HAP ⊢ ∃x(x r ϕ), where x r ϕ is a realizability interpretation of formulas
ϕ of HAω into formulas of HAP which combines Kleene recursive realizability with the model HRO.
They finally show that for a conservative extension HAPε of HAP, obtained from HAP by adding
Skolemization axioms of the form ∃yϕ(x, y)→ fϕ ·x ↓ and fϕ ·x→ ϕ(x, f ·x) for every arithmetical
formula of HAP, one proves that (2) HAPε ⊢ ϕ ↔ ∃x(x r ϕ) for every arithmetical formula ϕ.
Putting the pieces together one obtains for every arithmetical formula ϕ
HA
ω + AC ⊢ ϕ⇒ HAP ⊢ ∃x(x r ϕ)⇒ HAPε ⊢ ϕ⇒ HA ⊢ ϕ
It is worth noticing that the conservativity proof of HAPε over HAP is based on a forcing interpre-
tation p  ϕ of formulas ϕ of HAPε that resembles our forcing relation and that the proof of (2) is
similar to the proof of the self-realizability theorem.
For E-HAω + AC they define an extensional version x = y e ϕ of Kleene recursive realizability
combined with the model HEO, and they prove corresponding (1) and (2). This notion resembles
our (a, b) : ϕ.
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